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I. INTRODUCTION 
Jane Doe1 was born in San Juan, Puerto Rico on February 3, 1955.  In 
1957, several days short of her second birthday, Jane’s family left Puerto 
Rico for the Dominican Republic, where Jane resided until the age of twenty-
five.  While living in the Dominican Republic, Jane met a Dominican man 
with whom she had an out-of-wedlock child, John Doe.  By 1998, John had 
moved to the United States to take up residence in New York.  But John’s 
residency came to a halt in 2003, when he was placed in removal proceedings 
due to several criminal convictions.  In opposing removal, John claimed he 
acquired U.S. citizenship at birth based on the U.S. citizenship of his 
biological mother.  An immigration judge accepted John’s citizenship claim 
and terminated John’s removal proceedings. 
Notably, if one particular detail of John Doe’s story were altered—if, 
instead, John were born abroad to an unwed U.S.-citizen father rather than 
an unwed U.S.-citizen mother—his claim to birthright citizenship would 
have been denied, leaving him vulnerable to removal.  More specifically, 
John’s mother, Jane Doe, satisfied § 1409(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s (“INA”) requirement of one-year physical presence in the 
United States because she spent the first year of her life in the United States.2  
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2013, 
Montclair State University.  I am thankful to Professor Solangel Maldonado for introducing 
me to the Morales-Santana decision, sparking my interest in this subject matter, and to my 
faculty advisor, Professor Lori Nessel, for her guidance in the writing of this Comment.  I am 
also deeply thankful to my family for their unwavering love and support. 
 1  The name of this individual and the facts of her story are fabricated for purposes of 
this Comment. 
 2  Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018)) provides the framework for acquisition of U.S. 
citizenship at birth by a child born abroad to a U.S. citizen parent and a parent who is a citizen 
of another nation. 
Under the terms of the INA, the joint conduct of a citizen and an alien 
that results in conception is not sufficient to produce an American citizen, 
DE SOUSA (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2019  6:45 PM 
1124 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1123 
In contrast, if John’s U.S.-citizen parent were his father, a one-year presence 
in the United States would not suffice to confer citizenship because an unwed 
father must demonstrate a five-year physical presence in the United States 
prior to the child’s birth.3 
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this gender 
demarcation in Sessions v. Morales-Santana.4  In an effort to halt his removal 
proceedings, Luis Ramon Morales-Santana asserted U.S. citizenship at birth 
as derived from his U.S.-citizen father.5  The Supreme Court rejected his 
citizenship claim, however, affirming that Morales-Santana’s father was 
twenty days short of meeting the then-applicable ten-year physical presence 
requirement of § 1401(g).6  Even further, the Supreme Court held that the 
 
regardless of whether the citizen parent is the male or the female partner.  
If the two parties engage in a second joint act—if they agree to marry one 
another—citizenship will follow. 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433 (1998).  Accordingly, certain provisions of the INA 
determine the ability of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers and fathers, “acting separately, to confer 
citizenship on a child born outside of the United States.”  Id.  The general rule for determining 
who “shall be nationals . . . at birth” is found in § 1401, which provides for the U.S. citizenship 
of 
a person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its 
outlying possessions [to married] parents one of whom is an alien, and 
the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such 
person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying 
possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at 
least two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years. 
8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018) (emphasis added).  Further, § 1409 incorporates and extends “by 
reference the physical-presence requirements of § 1401” to children of unmarried parents, 
thereby allowing an “unwed citizen parent to transmit U.S. citizenship to a foreign-born child 
under the same terms as a married citizen parent.”  Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 
1678, 1687 (2017); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (2018).  Section 1409(c), however, provides 
an exception to the physical presence requirement of §§ 1401 and 1409(a) for U.S.-citizen 
mothers.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (2018).  Under this exception, “only one year of continuous 
physical presence is required before unwed mothers may pass [U.S.] citizenship to their 
children born abroad.”  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1687 (emphasis added); see also § 
1409(c). 
 3  See § 1401(g); cf. § 1409(c). 
 4  137 S. Ct. at 1686. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id.  “The law in effect at the time of birth governs whether a child obtained derivative 
citizenship as of his or her birth.  Accordingly, the 1952 Act provide[d] the statutory 
framework applicable to Morales-Santana’s nationality claim.”  Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 
804 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Sessions v. Morales-
Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2017) (citation omitted).  The 1952 Act included a physical-
presence requirement of ten years for unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, five of which must have 
been met after the age of fourteen, and a one-year physical-presence requirement for unwed 
U.S.-citizen mothers.  Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401(g) (1952) (amended 1986) (substituting 
“five years, at least two” for “ten years, at least five”), 1409(c).  The current version of the 
statute reduces the physical-presence requirement for unwed fathers to five years; however, 
“[t]he reduction affects only children born on or after November 14, 1986” and “[b]ecause 
Morales-Santana was born in 1962, his challenge [wa]s to the ten-years, five-after-age-14 
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gender-based differential in §§ 1401(g) and 1409(c) violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.7  To remedy the equal protection 
violation, the Court chose to remove the benefit that the statute conferred on 
mothers, rather than follow its customary approach of extending the benefit 
to the aggrieved class (the fathers).8  In other words, the Court eliminated the 
one-year exception for unwed mothers, thereby applying the current five-
year residency requirement to unwed fathers and mothers.9  Morales-
Santana is, thus, an anomalous ruling in the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence, particularly in light of Congress’s nearly complete power over 
immigration laws.10 
In the wake of Morales-Santana, commentators have critiqued the 
decision from two related perspectives.  Some contend that Morales-Santana 
adds to a line of Supreme Court decisions11 that signals an erosion of the 
Court’s longstanding deference to the political branches in immigration 
matters.12  Congress has traditionally exercised broad and nearly exclusive 
authority over immigration policy-making—a principle that is often referred 
to as the “plenary power doctrine.”13  Yet, there has been a recent “chipping 
 
requirement applicable at the time of his birth.”  137 S. Ct. at 1687 n.3 (internal citation 
omitted).  Nevertheless, the disparity in treatment of unwed U.S.-citizen fathers and unwed 
U.S.-citizen mothers persists in the current statute.  See §§ 1401(g), 1409(a), (c). 
 7  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1686 n.1 (“As this case involve[d] federal, not state, 
legislation, the applicable equality guarantee is not the Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit 
Equal Protection Clause, it is the guarantee implicit in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 8  Id. at 1698–1701. 
 9  Id. at 1701 (“Going forward, Congress may address the issue and settle on a uniform 
prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.  In the 
interim, as the Government suggests, § 1401[(g)]’s now-five-year requirement should apply, 
prospectively, to children born to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.”). 
 10  See Kristin A. Collins, Equality, Sovereignty, and the Family in Morales-Santana, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 170, 174 (2017) (arguing that the Morales-Santana “opinion marks the first 
time that modern equality principles of any sort have served as grounds for the Court to 
invalidate a statute governing the acquisition of citizenship”). 
 11  See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 12  See David Rubenstein, Immigration Symposium: The Future of Immigration 
Exceptionalism, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/immigra 
tion-symposium-future-immigration-exceptionalism/; Allissa Wickham, Citizenship Ruling 
May Spell Trouble for Plenary Power, LAW360 (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/933945/citizenship-ruling-may-spell-trouble-for-plenary-
power (“One of the most notable developments [in Session v. Morales-Santana] may be that 
the Supreme Court decided to apply constitutional analysis to immigration law at all, bucking 
what’s known as the plenary power doctrine . . . .”). 
 13  See Jon Feere, Plenary Power: Should Judges Control U.S. Immigration Policy?, CTR. 
FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Feb. 25, 2009), https://cis.org/Report/Plenary-Power-Should-Judges-
Control-US-Immigration-Policy (“Historically, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a hands-off 
approach when asked to review the political branches’ immigration decisions and 
policymaking.  The ability of Congress and the executive branch to regulate immigration 
largely without judicial intervention is what has come to be known as the political branches’ 
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away” at this doctrine, and some have posited that Morales-Santana supports 
“a greater willingness by the [C]ourt to apply . . . constitutional rules and 
heightened scrutiny to immigration laws enacted by Congress.”14  Others 
have criticized the Supreme Court’s decision to abrogate § 1409(c)’s one-
year exception for unwed mothers, and apply the harsher five-year physical-
presence requirement equally to unwed fathers and mothers.15  These 
commentators contend that Morales-Santana’s result does not comport with 
the Court’s established practice of remedying an equal protection violation 
by extending the particular benefit rather than nullifying it.16 
This Comment will examine the intersection of Congress’s plenary 
power and the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in light of 
Morales-Santana.  Part II of this Comment will discuss the history of the 
plenary power doctrine and briefly summarize Supreme Court rulings 
relevant to the doctrine.  Part III will analyze the Supreme Court’s gender-
based equal protection jurisprudence, with a particular focus on the Court’s 
longstanding practice of remedying equal protection violations by extending 
the benefit.  Part IV will provide a detailed discussion of the Morales-
Santana decision.  Part V will argue that the Court’s remedy in Morales-
Santana was improper, and that the Court should have extended, rather than 
eliminated, the benefit to remedy the constitutional infirmity.  Further, while 
Congress’s plenary power has recently yielded to constitutional principles, 
Morales-Santana’s choice of remedy signals an indisputable “chipping 
away” at Congress’s plenary power over immigration policies.  Part VI will 
 
‘plenary power’ over immigration.”).  
 14  Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, Immigration Discrimination? SCOTUS Says No, 
BNA (June 12, 2017), https://www.bna.com/immigration-discrimination-scotus-
n73014453468/; see also Collins, supra note 10, at 175 (“By quietly rejecting the contention 
that federal judges should defer to Congress when it regulates parent-child citizenship 
transmission along constitutionally suspect lines, Morales-Santana constrains an operative 
understanding of the plenary power doctrine and calls into question a core principle that 
purportedly undergirds it: that sovereignty necessarily implies a limitation of judicial 
authority.  Morales-Santana does not repudiate the plenary power doctrine, but it contains it 
and raises important questions concerning the doctrine’s future reach.”). 
 15  See Linda Greenhouse, Justice Ginsburg and the Price of Equality, N.Y. TIMES (June 
22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/22/opinion/ruth-bader-ginsburg-supreme-
court.html; David Issacson, Sessions v. Morales Santana: The Problems of Leveling Down, 
INSIGHTFUL IMMIGR. BLOG (June 21, 2017), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2017/06/sessions-v-
morales-santana-the-problems-of-leveling-down.html; Ian Samuel, Morales-Santana and the 
“Mean Remedy”, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 12, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/morales-
santana-and-the-mean-remedy. 
 16  See Greenhouse, supra note 15; Issacson, supra note 15; Samuel, supra note 15.  But 
see Tracy A. Thomas, Leveling Down Gender Equality, 42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 2 (2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3157987&download=yes (explaining 
that the Court’s “‘leveling down’ of the remedy—responding to inequality by reducing 
benefits to all rather than leveling up and extending benefits to the disadvantaged group—is 
unusual, but not unheard of”). 
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conclude. 
II. THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE 
After Morales-Santana, the boundaries and vigor of the plenary power 
doctrine remain uncertain; however, the doctrine’s origins and early 
Supreme Court precedent demonstrate historical support for broad 
congressional power over immigration matters.  For more than a century, the 
Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s “absolute and unqualified” 
power—plenary power—over immigration, and has accordingly limited its 
judicial review of immigration policies.17  This practice, in turn, has resulted 
in diluted constitutional analysis in matters involving immigration law,18 
with the Court “declar[ing] itself powerless to review even those 
immigration provisions that explicitly classify on such disfavored bases as 
race, gender, and legitimacy.”19  This Part begins with an analysis of the 
origins of Congress’s plenary power over immigration, followed by a 
discussion of the development of the doctrine, particularly in the context of 
gender-based equal protection challenges, through a case-by-case analysis. 
A. The Doctrine’s Origins 
The United States Constitution does not explicitly grant the power to 
regulate immigration to a specific branch of government.  Article I, Section 
8 of the Constitution invests the power “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of 
Naturalization” in Congress.20  On its face, this provision does not grant 
Congress absolute power over immigration.  Still, Congress’s plenary power 
is firmly rooted in Supreme Court precedent as evidenced by recurrent 
affirmations that immigration matters21 “are so exclusively entrusted to the 
political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial 
 
 17  See Feere, supra note 13; see also Jessica Portmess, Comment, Until the Plenary 
Power Do Us Part: Judicial Scrutiny of the Defense of Marriage Act in Immigration After 
Flores-Villar, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1825, 1829 (2012); Developments in the Law—Immigrant 
Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1584 (2013) (“The plenary 
power acts as a ‘shield’ against what could otherwise be meritorious individual rights claims 
sounding in the equal protection and substantive due process components of the Fifth 
Amendment.”). 
 18  Generally, “the term ‘immigration law’ [is] used to describe the body of law governing 
the admission and the expulsion of aliens.”  Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the 
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 256 (1984) [hereinafter 
Legomsky, Principle of Plenary Congressional Power].  This term is used accordingly in this 
Comment’s discussion of the plenary power doctrine. 
 19  Id. at 255.  
 20  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 21  Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 381 
(2004) (explaining that the plenary power doctrine is not all-encompassing and instead “most 
clearly protects the political branches of the federal government in their exercise of power to 
exclude and expel aliens”) (emphasis added). 
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inquiry or interference.”22  The plenary power doctrine may be characterized 
as a “doctrine of judicial deference” or, relatedly, a doctrine of “unlimited 
congressional power.”23  But regardless of its characterization, the Court has 
invoked the doctrine to rebuff constitutional challenges to immigration laws, 
choosing instead to engage in only a minimal review of such laws when their 
constitutionality is at issue.24  This judicial hesitancy to engage in 
constitutional analysis has provided a “virtual blank check” to Congress to 
formulate immigration laws as it sees fit and an ensuing judicial deference 
to such judgment.25 
The Court first gave life to Congress’s plenary power in its 1889 
Chinese Exclusion Case.26  An Act of Congress prohibited Chinese laborers 
from reentering the United States if they had departed before the passage of 
the Act.27  A Chinese laborer who had received a certificate of return, but 
who was then denied the right to reenter, challenged the validity of the Act.28  
Rejecting his contentions, the Court held that determinations by Congress 
regarding the admission of aliens were “conclusive upon the judiciary”—
thereby crafting Congress’s plenary power over immigration matters.29  
After the Chinese Exclusion Case, the Court continued to elaborate on and 
develop Congress’s plenary power.  In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,30 the 
Court extended the ruling in the Chinese Exclusion Case, declaring that 
Congress also had exclusive and plenary power over the expulsion of aliens 
from the United States.31  Notably, the Court in Fong Yue Ting 
 
 22  Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952). 
 23  Cox, supra note 21, at 381–86 (discussing the overlapping characterizations of the 
plenary power doctrine, including a characterization of the doctrine as one of “alien 
standing”).  Interpreting the doctrine as one of judicial deference means that courts “are 
generally not the appropriate institution to evaluate [constitutional] constraints” on 
Congress’s power to regulate immigration.  Id. at 382.  Separate but analogous, interpreting 
the doctrine as one of unlimited congressional power means that “Congress’s power over 
immigration is simply unlimited by any constitutional constraints.”  Id. at 384. 
 24  Id. at 382.  
 25  See Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: 
Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1617 (2000) [hereinafter Legomsky, 
Immigration and Judicial Review]. 
 26  Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 27  Id. at 582. 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. at 606.  The Court justified its decision and found support for the plenary power 
doctrine in a principle of inherent national sovereignty, reasoning that the federal 
government’s ability, through Congress, to “exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition 
[not] open to controversy.  Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of 
every independent nation.”  Id. at 603. 
 30  149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (justifying the “right of a nation to expel or deport 
foreigners” as inherent to national sovereignty, similar to the justification provided in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case). 
 31  See id. 
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acknowledged a procedural due process exception to the plenary power 
doctrine solely for foreign nationals within the United States;32 however, the 
Court later emphasized that the doctrine continued to prevent judicial review 
of substantive due process challenges.33 
The Court strengthened and reaffirmed Congress’s absolute power over 
immigration in a series of cases in the 1950s, endorsing its nearly nonexistent 
review of the constitutionality of immigration policies.34  In Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy,35 the Court upheld the exclusion of the alien wife of a U.S. 
citizen with broad deference to Congress’s decision and method of 
exclusion.36  The Court reasoned that, “[w]hatever the rule may be 
concerning deportation of persons who have gained entry into the United 
States, it is not within the province of any court, unless expressly authorized 
by law, to review the determination of the political branch of the Government 
to exclude a given alien.”37  Similarly, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
rel. Mezei,38 the Court sustained an alien’s exclusion on Ellis Island, 
reasoning that the “right to enter the United States depends on the 
congressional will, and courts cannot substitute their judgment for the 
legislative mandate.”39 
Thereafter, the Court invoked the plenary power doctrine to uphold the 
removal of members of the Communist Party,40 and to reject a Marxist 
scholar’s First Amendment challenge to his exclusion from the United 
States.41  But intricate and novel challenges to immigration policies required 
the Court to acknowledge, and to attempt to reconcile, the tension between 
 
 32  See id. at 701, 728 (explaining that foreign nationals within the United States were 
afforded some procedural due process protections, but that such protections did not extend to 
foreign nationals seeking entry); see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (explaining that such protections did not extend to aliens “on the 
threshold of initial entry”). 
 33  See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 102 (1903); see also Portmess, supra note 17, at 
1833–34 (discussing the Court’s acknowledgment of a procedural due process exception to 
the plenary power). 
 34  See generally Mezei, 345 U.S. at 206; Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 35  338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
 36  Id. at 542, 547 (relying on the justification raised in the Chinese Exclusion Case and 
Fong Yue Ting that “[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty,” and 
extending the plenary power and, accordingly, judicial deference to executive officer 
determinations enforcing Congress’s rules of admissibility). 
 37  Id. at 543. 
 38  345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 39  Id. at 216. 
 40  See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (affirming that entrusting the 
formulation of immigration policies exclusively to Congress “has become about as firmly 
imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our 
government”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
 41  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
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substantive constitutional safeguards and the plenary power doctrine, which 
historically justified the Court’s decision to “decline[] to review federal 
immigration statutes for compliance with substantive constitutional 
restraints.”42  Accordingly, the Court gradually established “unusual 
standards” for reviewing substantive constitutional challenges to 
immigration policies.43 
B. The Supreme Court’s Modern Approach to the Plenary Power 
Doctrine 
Notwithstanding the fortitude of Congress’s plenary power, the 
Supreme Court gradually moved away from its traditional, absolute “hands-
off” approach to immigration matters.44  In so doing, the Court developed a 
judicial role in assessing the constitutionality of immigration laws, 
particularly in areas that did not directly involve deportation or exclusion.45  
The evolution of this judicial role, however, has produced uncertainties 
surrounding the status of the plenary power doctrine.46  While the Court has 
invoked Congress’s plenary power in a range of recent immigration cases,47 
the Court has applied varying levels of scrutiny in analyzing the alleged 
constitutional infirmities, and has avoided defining the contours of the 
doctrine, leaving future courts without a clear rule to follow.48 
1. Fiallo v. Bell 
In Fiallo v. Bell,49 the Supreme Court addressed an equal protection 
challenge to § 101(b)(1)(D) and 101(b)(2)50 of the INA.  The provisions gave 
special preference immigration status to aliens who were the children of 
U.S.-citizen (or lawful-permanent resident) mothers, and to aliens who were 
 
 42  See Legomsky, Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, supra note 18, at 255. 
 43  Portmess, supra note 17, at 1838–39. 
 44  See Developments in the Law: Immigrant Rights & Immigration Enforcement, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1565, 1585 (2013) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (“[C]ourts have 
reviewed immigration laws, but have subjected them to only the most deferential standard—
rational basis review.”); Portmess, supra note 17, at 1838–39. 
 45  Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, 
and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 926 n.7 (1994) [hereinafter Legomsky, Ten 
More Years of Plenary Power]. 
 46  Compare Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
339 (2002) (arguing that the Court’s recent immigration decisions indicate the end of the 
plenary power doctrine), with Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: 
A Response to Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835 (2002) (arguing that the plenary 
power doctrine still influences the Court’s decisions, albeit not explicitly). 
 47  See infra pp. 9–17. 
 48  See Developments in the Law, supra note 44, at 1588–89. 
 49  430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 50  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(b)(1)(D), 1101(b)(2) (1952); see also Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788. 
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unwed mothers of U.S.-citizen (or lawful-permanent resident) children.51  
Unwed fathers and their nonmarital children challenged the constitutionality 
of the provisions after being denied special immigration preference.52  The 
fathers and children contended that the provisions violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee by discriminating against unwed 
fathers and their nonmarital children “on the basis of the father’s marital 
status, the illegitimacy of the child[,] and the sex of the parent without . . . 
compelling or rational justification.”53  In other words, the gender 
demarcation in the provisions made it unjustifiably more difficult for 
nonmarital children and their natural fathers to attain special preference 
immigration, as compared with nonmarital children and their natural 
mothers. 
At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court underscored the 
“limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation” and, thus, 
rejected a more searching standard of review.54  In holding the statutory 
provisions constitutional under a rational basis review, the Court explained 
that, although Congress’s distinction between nonmarital children of unwed 
fathers and those of unwed mothers potentially “den[ied] preferential status 
to parents and children who share[d] strong family ties,” it was beyond the 
scope of the judicial role to examine the justifications for Congress’s 
legislative decision.55  Invoking Congress’s broad plenary power over 
 
 51  Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 788.  The INA requires, among other conditions, that an alien 
seeking admission into the United States as a legal permanent resident satisfy a numerical 
quota and certain labor certification requirements.  Id. at 789–90.  Congress, however, allowed 
American citizens to petition for waiver of the requirements for their immediate families.  Id 
at 800–01.  The respective provisions of the Act 
grant[ed] special preference immigration status to aliens who qualif[ied] 
as the “children” or “parents” of United States citizens or lawful 
permanent residents.  Under § 101(b)(1), a “child” [wa]s defined as an 
unmarried person under 21 years of age who [wa]s a legitimate or 
legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an illegitimate child 
seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with his natural mother.  
The definition d[id] not extend to an illegitimate child seeking preference 
by virtue of his relationship with his natural father.  Moreover, under § 
101(b)(2), a person qualifie[d] as a “parent” . . . solely on the basis of the 
person’s relationship with a “child.”  As a result, the natural father of an 
illegitimate child who is either a United States citizen or permanent 
resident alien is not entitled to preferential treatment as a “parent.” 
Id. at 788–89 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 52  Id. at 790. 
 53  Id. at 791. 
 54  Id. at 792 (explaining that Supreme Court precedent “ha[s] long recognized the power 
to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely immune from judicial control” and rejecting plaintiff-appellant’s 
argument that such broad power did not apply in this case (citations omitted)). 
 55  Id. at 798–99 (citations omitted). 
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immigration matters, the Court added that it did not have authority to 
overrule Congress’s political judgment.56 
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan, 
agreed with the majority’s willingness to review the immigration statute at 
issue; however, he disagreed with its “toothless” review.57  The dissenters 
reasoned that the provisions at issue involved the rights of citizens rather 
than aliens, and “discrimination among citizens cannot escape traditional 
constitutional scrutiny simply because it occurs in the context of immigration 
legislation.”58  Accordingly, the dissenters found the majority’s undue 
deference to Congress inappropriate and would have applied a heightened 
standard of review.59 
2. Miller v. Albright 
The Court’s strong deference to Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration matters was further substantiated in Miller v. Albright,60 in 
which a U.S.-citizen father and his foreign-born daughter challenged the 
constitutionality of the gender distinction present in § 1409(a) of the INA.61  
The provision delineates the requirements for transmission of U.S. 
citizenship to a child born out of wedlock in a foreign country, and it draws 
a distinction between the child of a U.S.-citizen mother and the child of a 
U.S.-citizen father.62  More specifically, the provision provides that, subject 
to residence requirements for the citizen parent,63 a child born abroad to an 
unwed citizen mother acquires U.S. citizenship at birth, whereas a child born 
abroad to an unwed citizen father acquires citizenship only once certain 
legitimation requirements are satisfied.64 
 
 56  Id. at 799.  Congress’s decision to withhold preferential statute from nonmarital 
children and their fathers “nonetheless remains one solely for the responsibility of the 
Congress and wholly outside the power of this Court to control.”  Id. 
 57  Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 805. 
 58  Id. at 806, 809. 
 59  Id. at 810. 
 60  523 U.S. 420 (1998). 
 61  Codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (2018).  Petitioner did not challenge the 
gender distinction prevalent in §§ 1409(c) and 1409(g)’s residency requirement as Petitioner’s 
father satisfied the residency requirement.  Miller, 523 U.S. at 430. 
 62  See § 1409(a). 
 63  These residency requirements are delineated in §§ 1409(c) and 1409(g), and are 
challenged in Morales-Santana. 
 64  Miller, 523 U.S. at 430–31.  Section 1409(a) imposes four requirements that unmarried 
U.S.-citizen fathers must satisfy to confer citizenship on a child born out of wedlock to an 
alien mother in another country. Citizenship is established if: 
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established 
by clear and convincing evidence; 
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the 
person’s birth; 
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Luz Penero was born out of wedlock in the Philippines to a U.S.-citizen 
father and a Filipino mother.65  She sought U.S. citizenship after turning 
eighteen, but the Government denied her application because her father 
failed to legitimate her before her eighteenth birthday.66  Upon denial of her 
application, Penero and her father filed suit alleging that the legitimation 
requirements imposed on unwed fathers, but not on unwed mothers, were the 
“product[s] of overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and 
women,” and thus, violated the Equal Protection Clause.67 
In rejecting the equal protection challenge,68 the Court determined that 
the legitimation requirement imposed solely on unwed fathers served three 
important purposes: (1) “ensuring reliable proof of a biological relationship 
between the potential citizen and [the] citizen parent”; (2) “encouraging the 
development of a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the 
child while the child is a minor”; and (3) “fostering ties between the foreign-
born child and the United States.”69  The Court reasoned that the biological 
differences between unwed fathers and unwed mothers “provide a relevant 
basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer citizenship on 
 
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial 
support for the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years; and 
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years— 
(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person’s residence 
or domicile, 
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under 
oath, or 
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a 
competent court. 
Only the second of these four requirements is expressly included in § 
1409(c), the provision applicable to unwed citizen mothers.   
8 U.S.C. § 1409(a).  
 65  Miller, 523 U.S. at 425. 
 66  Id. at 424–25.  In addition to the disparate duration of residency requirement imposed 
on mothers and fathers, § 1409 also requires that a U.S.-citizen father, but not a U.S.-citizen 
mother, take “one of three affirmative steps” before the child attains the age of eighteen to 
confer U.S. citizenship on his nonmarital child: “legitimation; a declaration of paternity under 
oath by the father; or a court order of paternity.”  Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 62 (2001).  
It is this affirmative requirement that the daughter and her father challenged as the “father 
satisfied the residency requirement” and thus, “the validity of the [gender] distinction in that 
requirement . . . [wa]s not at issue.”  Miller, 523 U.S. at 430. 
 67  Id. at 435 (internal quotations omitted). 
 68  Id. at 434 (internal citations omitted).  “Deference to the political branches dictates ‘a 
narrow standard of review of decisions made by the Congress . . . in the area of immigration 
and naturalization.’”  Id. at 434 n.11.  The Court added that “[e]ven if . . . the heightened 
scrutiny that normally governs gender discrimination claims applied in this context, [it was] 
persuaded that the [legitimation] requirement imposed . . . on children of unmarried male, but 
not female, citizens is substantially related to important governmental objectives.”  Id. at 431, 
434 n.11 (citations omitted). 
 69  Id. at 436, 438. 
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children born in foreign lands.”70  In turn, these differences underpinned § 
1409(a)’s gender demarcation,71 which the Court concluded was well 
tailored to serve the Government’s interests.72  The Court, however, did not 
produce a majority opinion and the constitutionality of § 1409(a) remained 
an open question.73 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, agreed that § 1409(a) should 
be upheld, but on different grounds.  The Justices maintained that the Court 
did not have the authority to review the constitutionality of the statute and to 
provide the relief requested because only Congress has the power to 
prescribe the requirements for conferral of citizenship on persons not born 
within the United States.74  The plain language of § 1409 sets forth a 
precondition that Congress deemed appropriate to the acquisition of 
citizenship, no matter that it encompasses a gender distinction.  Accordingly, 
the Justices added that “even if the Court were to agree that the difference in 
treatment between the illegitimate children of citizen-fathers and citizen-
mothers is unconstitutional, it could not, consistent with the extremely 
limited judicial power in this area, remedy that constitutional infirmity.”75  
More specifically, the Justices posited that the Court could not extend or 
 
 70  Id. at 422. 
 71  Miller, 523 U.S. at 445.  The Court reasoned that whereas there is no time-sensitive 
legitimation requirement for unwed mothers, “the argument overlooks the difference between 
a substantive condition and a procedural limitation.”  Id. at 435.  More specifically, “the blood 
relationship to the birth mother” is established at the time of birth—the substantive conduct 
that qualifies her child for citizenship.  Id. at 436.  In contrast, such a relationship to the father 
is not so immediate and, thus Congress imposed an eighteen-year requirement within which 
an unwed father must demonstrate such a relationship in order to transmit citizenship.  Id.  
The Court emphasized that there was “no procedural hurdle that limit[ed] the time or the 
method by which either parent (or the child) [could] provide . . . evidence that the necessary 
steps were taken to transmit citizenship to the child.”  Id. at 435.  Accordingly, the requirement 
did not impose a burden on unwed fathers.  Id. at 436. 
 72  Id.  
 73  Four Justices, in two different opinions, rejected the challenge to the gender-based 
distinction.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Rehnquist, found the statute consistent with the 
Fifth Amendment, while Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concluded that the Court 
could not provide a remedy even if the statute violated equal protection.  Id. at 423, 452.  
Conversely, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Breyer, would have found 
the statute unconstitutional as violating the Equal Protection Clause.  Id. at 460.  Finally, 
Justice O’Conner and Justice Kennedy would have dismissed on standing grounds, reasoning 
that the child lacked standing to raise an equal protection challenge on behalf of his father.  
Id. at 445. 
 74  Id. at 453, 456 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“An alien who seeks political rights as a 
member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified 
by Congress.  Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
 75  Id. at 423, 456 (internal citations omitted) (“Because only Congress has the power to 
set the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by persons not born within the territory of 
the United States, federal courts cannot exercise that power under the guise of their remedial 
authority.”). 
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eliminate the benefits conferred by § 1409(a) because doing so would require 
the Court “to speculate as to what Congress would have enacted if it had not 
enacted what it did,” and that is incompatible with Congress’s plenary power 
over immigration.76 
3. Nguyen v. I.N.S. 
After Fiallo and Miller, the Court appeared to signal a shift in its broad 
deference to Congress’s plenary power, subjecting certain statutes to a more 
stringent constitutional analysis.  In Nguyen v. I.N.S.,77 the Court accepted a 
second opportunity to assess the constitutionality of § 1409(a) of the INA.78  
Tuan Anh Nguyen and his father challenged the constitutionality of § 
1409(a) after the government denied Nguyen’s claim for derivative U.S. 
citizenship.79  Nguyen was born in Vietnam to a U.S.-citizen father and a 
Vietnamese mother, but moved to the U.S. at the age of six where he 
remained as a lawful permanent resident.80  In 1995, the government initiated 
deportation proceedings against Nguyen and ultimately ordered his 
deportation, as his father had failed to take the affirmative steps necessary 
for Nguyen to obtain citizenship under § 1409(a).81  Nguyen and his father 
contended that the provision violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal 
protection guarantee by unjustifiably imposing different requirements for 
acquisition of U.S. citizenship by children born abroad to a U.S.-citizen 
father.82 
Applying “equal protection scrutiny,”83 the Court rejected the challenge 
and held that the disparate treatment of mothers and fathers under § 1409(a) 
did not violate the equal protection guarantee.84  The Court relied largely on 
the governmental objectives and biological differences emphasized in Miller 
 
 76  Id. at 457, 459 (“We are dealing here with an exercise of the Nation’s sovereign power 
to admit or exclude foreigners in accordance with perceived national interests.  Federal judges 
may not decide what those national interests are, and what requirements for citizenship best 
serve them.”). 
 77  533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 78  See supra note 2. 
 79  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57. 
 80  Id. 
 81  Id. at 57–58.  In addition to the disparate duration of residency requirement imposed 
on mother and fathers, § 1409 also requires that a U.S.-citizen father, but not a U.S.-citizen 
mother, take “one of three affirmative steps” before the child attains the age of eighteen to 
confer U.S. citizenship on his nonmarital child: “legitimation; a declaration of paternity under 
oath by the father; or a court order of paternity.”  Id. at 62.  It is this affirmative requirement 
that Nguyen and his father challenged.  Id. at 57–58. 
 82  Id. at 58. 
 83  Id. at 60–61.  The Court assumed, without deciding, that intermediate scrutiny applied 
given the gender-based classifications at issue, refusing to consider whether a lesser degree 
of scrutiny could apply in light of Congress’s plenary power.  Id. 
 84  Id. at 58–59. 
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in support of the constitutionality of § 1409(a),85 and similarly concluded 
that “Congress ha[d] not erected inordinate and unnecessary hurdles to the 
conferral of citizenship on the children of citizen fathers in furthering its 
important objectives.”86  Notably, however, the Court refused to identify the 
standard of review applicable in immigration cases involving constitutional 
questions, particularly in light of Congress’s plenary power.  The Court 
reasoned that, because the statute satisfied heightened scrutiny, the Court did 
not need to “decide whether some lesser degree of scrutiny pertains.”87 
In dicta, the Court noted that, if the provision had not survived 
heightened scrutiny, Nguyen and his father would not necessarily prevail, as 
the Court would likely face difficulties in fashioning a remedy.88  More 
specifically, remedying the constitutional violation would require the Court 
to sever the provision, which would problematically confer “citizenship on 
terms other than those specified by Congress.”89  Still, the Court avoided 
resolving this issue given the constitutionality of the provision.  Justice 
O’Connor, in a dissenting opinion, critiqued the Court’s application of the 
heightened scrutiny standard, concluding that the gender classification did 
not substantially relate to the alleged governmental interests.90 
4. United States v. Flores-Villar 
After Nguyen, it was unclear just how deferential the Court remained 
to Congress’s policy decisions regarding immigration matters.  In its most 
recent treatment of Congress’s plenary power prior to its decision in 
Morales-Santana, the Court tangentially addressed the constitutionality of 
§§ 1401 and 140991 in United States v. Flores-Villar.92  Ruben Flores-Villar, 
 
 85  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62–68. 
 86  Id. at 70–71.  The Court explained that “[i]n the case of a citizen mother and a child 
born overseas, the opportunity for a meaningful relationship between citizen parent and child 
inheres in the very event of birth.”  Id. at 65.  Accordingly, the gender demarcation considered 
“a biological difference” between fathers and mothers and thus, it was a lawful and “sensible 
statutory scheme, given the unique relationship of the mother to the event of birth.”  Id. at 64. 
 87  Id. at 61. 
 88  Id. at 72. 
 89  Id. at 71–72.  The Court highlighted the required deference to Congress’s intent by 
noting that 
Congress expressly provided with respect to the very subchapter of the 
United States Code at issue and in a provision entitled “Sole procedure” 
that “[a] person may only be naturalized as a citizen of the United States 
in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this subchapter and 
not otherwise.” 
Id. at 72; see also infra Part IV for a discussion of Morales-Santana, where the Court 
ultimately considers and decides this issue. 
 90  Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 74–97 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 91  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 92  536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided court per curiam 564 U.S. 
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a Mexican-native born to a U.S.-citizen father and a Mexican mother, 
claimed U.S. citizenship as derived from his father as a defense to 
deportation proceedings.93  Upon denial of his claim, Flores-Villar 
challenged the constitutionality of §§ 1401 and 1409, arguing that the 
provisions classified and discriminated on the basis of gender and age.94 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ostensibly applying 
intermediate scrutiny, upheld the constitutionality of §§ 1401 and 1409.  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that the provisions could survive an equal protection 
challenge “under intermediate scrutiny, a rational basis standard, or some 
other level of review in between,” but like the Supreme Court in Nguyen, the 
court assumed that intermediate scrutiny applied.95  The court reasoned that, 
while the means at issue in Nguyen—legitimation requirement for fathers—
were different from the means at issue in Flores-Villar—longer residency 
requirement for fathers—the “government’s interests [we]re no less 
important, and the particular means no less substantially related to those 
objectives,” particularly “in light of the virtually plenary power that 
Congress has to legislate in the area of immigration and citizenship.”96 
Still, the Ninth Circuit refused to decide which level of constitutional 
scrutiny is most appropriate in immigration cases, leaving it an open 
question.97  The Supreme Court affirmed Flores-Villar “by an equally 
divided Court” without issuing an opinion.98  Because “an affirmance by an 
equally divided Court [is not] entitled to precedential weight,”99 Flores-
Villar did not elucidate the Court’s position on the plenary power doctrine 
or the standard of review that should be applied in such cases.100 
After Flores-Villar, commentators highlighted the Court’s hesitancy to 
issue a clear opinion on the plenary power doctrine’s modern boundaries.  
Some interpreted the Court’s affirmance in Flores-Villar, among its other 
decisions, as a “refus[al] to clarify the standard of scrutiny that applies in 
challenges to immigration statutes,” which leaves the viability of the plenary 
 
210 (2011), abrogated by Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
 93  Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d at 994. 
 94  Id. at 994–95. 
 95  Id. at 996 n.2. 
 96  Id. at 996–97 (internal citation omitted).  As in Nguyen, the Government in Flores-
Villar asserted that the gender demarcation substantially furthered certain governmental 
interests; namely (1) the assurance “that a biological parent-child relationship exists” and (2) 
avoiding statelessness of children by ensuring a connection to the United States.  Id. at 995–
96.  In both instances, the Government argued that mothers and fathers are situated differently 
as the parent-child relationship is easily established at birth for the mother but not for the 
father.  Id. 
 97  Id. at 996 n.2. 
 98  Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210, 210 (2011) (per curiam). 
 99  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972). 
 100  See Developments in the Law, supra note 44, at 1591. 
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power doctrine uncertain.101  Others argued that the Court’s failure to 
explicitly invoke the doctrine in its recent decisions, thereby engaging in a 
form of constitutional analysis, signals that “the grave has been dug” for 
Congress’s plenary power.102  In light of the diluted scrutiny applied by the 
Court in its recent immigration cases, however, it is evident that the plenary 
power continues to influence the Court’s decisions, even if the Court does 
not invoke it explicitly.103  The Court ultimately tackled this issue in 
Morales-Santana, albeit in a manner that arguably departed from its 
traditional approach to the plenary power doctrine.104 
III. GENDER-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that no 
State shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”105  This prohibition extends to the federal government through the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.106  While the Equal Protection 
Clause does not prevent the states and the federal government from treating 
different classes of persons differently,107 it prohibits, among other things, 
gender classifications that rest on stereotypical notions about the relative 
roles and abilities of each gender.108  This Part examines the history of the 
Equal Protection Clause as it applies to gender classifications in federal 
legislation, with a particular focus on the Supreme Court’s practice of 
extending, rather than nullifying, a benefit to redress an equal protection 
 
 101  See Portmess, supra note 17, at 1829. 
 102  See Spiro, supra note 46, at 340. 
 103  See Pillard, supra note 46, at 836, 846–47 (arguing that the Court has merely driven 
the doctrine “underground”). 
 104  See infra Part IV; see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452–59 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 105  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 106  See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (“The Fifth 
Amendment . . . does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth 
Amendment[,] which applies only to the states,” but “it would be unthinkable that the same 
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”). 
 107  See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (“The Equal Protection Clause directs that 
‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”  “[T]he Constitution does not 
require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were 
the same.”) (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Reed v. Reed, 404 
U.S. 71, 75 (1971) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat 
different classes of persons in different ways.”). 
 108  See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1696–97 (2017); Califano v. 
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (explaining that the gender demarcations in a provision of 
the Social Security Act were “part of the ‘baggage of sexual stereotypes’” that the father’s 
primary responsibility is breadwinning, while the mother’s is hearthtending, and that 
“[l]egislation that rests on such presumptions, without more,” could not survive equal 
protection scrutiny). 
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violation.109 
A. A Brief History of Equal Protection and Gender-Based 
Classifications 
Courts have generally regarded federal legislation that differentiates on 
the basis of gender as presumptively invalid “because gender generally 
provides no sensible ground for differential treatment.”110  Accordingly, 
courts addressing an equal protection challenge to a gender-based 
classification typically apply intermediate scrutiny.111  Notably, however, the 
level of scrutiny applied to such classifications has changed considerably 
over the past several years.112  Until the early 1970s, gender-based 
classifications were subjected only to rational basis review—the lowest level 
of judicial scrutiny.113  But the Court changed course in Reed v. Reed.114  In 
its first decision invalidating a gender-based classification as 
unconstitutional, the Court recognized that gender-based discrimination 
should be subjected to a more stringent scrutiny than rational basis.115  Still, 
the Court stopped short of explicitly adopting a heightened standard of 
 
 109  Extending the benefit is often colloquially referred to as “leveling up,” and nullifying 
the benefit is colloquially referred to as “leveling down.”  See Deborah L. Brake, When 
Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 515 (2004) (“[I]nequality may be remedied either by leveling up 
and improving the treatment of the disadvantaged class, or by leveling down and bringing the 
group that is better off down to the level of those worse off.” (footnote omitted)) 
 110  Rachel L. Jensen et al., Equal Protection, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 213, 230 (2000). 
 111  Id.  Intermediate (or heightened) scrutiny is a standard of constitutional review used 
by courts in equal protection cases.  See Justin Hess, Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and 
the Supremacy Clause, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2277, 2280–81 (2010).  Specifically, intermediate 
scrutiny is used to determine whether gender classifications in legislation are constitutional.  
“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are ‘subject to scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause[]’” and “[t]o withstand constitutional challenge . . . 
classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be 
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 
(1976).  Further, if a statute does not implicate a fundamental right or does not affect certain 
protected classes, a court may apply a more deferential standard of review known as rational 
basis review.  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 (1938); see 
also infra note 112 and accompanying text.  Immigration provisions that involve gender 
classifications have been reviewed under rational basis rather than intermediate scrutiny.  See 
generally Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 112  See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873); 
see also Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict Scrutiny 
to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 953 (1996). 
 113  Brake, supra note 112.  Under rational basis review, a classification survives 
constitutional scrutiny if it is “rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.”  Id.  
“Courts have only rarely struck down government classifications under rational basis review.”  
Id. 
 114  404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating an Idaho statute that preferred males over females as 
administrators of estates). 
 115  Id. at 75–76. 
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review.116 
In Frontiero v. Richardson,117 a plurality of the Court expanded Reed 
to conclude that gender-based classifications should be subjected to strict 
scrutiny.118  The Court nevertheless retreated from this exacting standard of 
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren119 and gave life to intermediate scrutiny.120  In 
invalidating an Oklahoma statute that prohibited the sale of beer to males 
under twenty-one and to females under eighteen, a majority of the Court 
found Reed controlling, and held that gender-based classifications should be 
subjected to intermediate scrutiny.121  The Court identified the standard for 
this level of scrutiny that courts still use with precision today: “To withstand 
constitutional challenge, . . . classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.”122  Finally, the Court refined (and arguably intensified) 
this standard of scrutiny in subsequent gender-discrimination cases.123  The 
Court provided that, apart from the standard articulated in Craig, a 
challenged gender-based classification will be upheld only if there is an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classification.124 
As previously discussed, this heightened standard of scrutiny has not 
held constant in cases involving immigration statutes that discriminate on the 
basis of gender.125  In such cases, the Court has indisputably considered 
Congress’s plenary power over immigration, and has modified its 
intermediate scrutiny to one that is more deferential—arguably akin to 
rational basis review.126  In the words of one commentator, “[a]t the 
 
 116  Id.  Although the Court did not formally adopt heightened scrutiny, it applied 
something more stringent than rational basis review.  Id.  The Court provided that “[a] 
classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”‘  Id. at 76. 
 117  411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating a fringe benefits statute that automatically 
considered spouses of servicemen dependents for purposes of obtaining benefits, but required 
servicewomen to prove actual dependency by their spouses in order to obtain identical 
benefits). 
 118  Id. at 688 (“[W]e can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like 
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must 
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”). 
 119  429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 120  Id. at 197. 
 121  Id. at 197–98. 
 122  Id. at 197; see also Jensen et al., supra note 110, at 232–33. 
 123  See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); 
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); see also Brake, supra note 112, 
at 956. 
 124  Id.; see also Jensen et al., supra note 110, at 238; Brake, supra note 112, at 956.  
 125  See supra Part II.B. 
 126  See supra Part II.B. 
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intersection of immigration and equal protection lies a judicial vortex.  This 
area of law is a twilight zone of sorts, where established constitutional 
principles do not follow their regular paths.”127 
B. Supreme Court’s Practice of Extending the Benefit to Remedy 
Gender Discrimination 
Once the Supreme Court ascertains that a federal statute128 violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, it must determine how to redress the constitutional 
infirmity.  The appropriate remedy is generally a mandate of equal 
treatment,129 but “[h]ow equality is accomplished . . . is a matter on which 
the Constitution is silent.”130  The Supreme Court must provide a 
constitutionally sufficient remedy and thereby “serve as a short-term 
surrogate for the legislature.”131  The Court generally fulfills this role by 
assessing whether the unconstitutionally discriminatory benefit should be 
extended or nullified.132  Traditionally, the Court has chosen “extension, 
rather than nullification” as the proper course,133 and until Sessions v. 
Morales-Santana, the Court had never ordered nullification of a benefit to 
redress an equal protection violation.134  In view of this, nowhere is the 
 
 127  Hess, supra note 111, at 2277. 
 128  See Sabina Mariella, Note, Leveling up Over Plenary Power: Remedying an 
Impermissible Gender Classification in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
219, 232 (2016) (explaining that the Supreme Court seeks redress when a federal statute 
violates the Equal Protection Clause; however, when the Court considers “state action or 
legislation . . . [it] has often avoided the question by remanding the remedial decision to state 
courts” due to federalism concerns). 
 129  See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 740 (1984). 
 130  Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 426–27 (2010) (citing Mathews, 465 
U.S. at 740). 
 131  See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair 
Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 317 (1979); see also Bruce K. Miller, 
Constitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes: A Critical Approach of Heckler v. 
Mathews, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 131 (1985). 
 132  See Mathews, 465 U.S. at 738 (“[A] court . . . faces ‘two remedial alternatives: [it] 
may either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not extend to the class that 
the legislature intended to benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the statute to include those 
who are aggrieved by the exclusion.’” (internal citations omitted)); see also Brake, supra note 
109, at 515 (“In the canon of equal protection, it is seemingly well-settled that inequality may 
be remedied either by leveling up and improving the treatment of the disadvantaged class, or 
by leveling down and bringing the group that is better off down to the level of those worse 
off.”). 
 133  See, e.g., Mathews, 465 U.S. at 739 n.5.  While the Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed its preference for leveling up, some scholars contend that a potential reason for the 
avoidance of leveling down is that it could “confront[] persons disadvantaged by inequality 
with a double bind: challenge the inequality and risk worsening the situation for others instead 
of improving one’s own situation, or continue to endure unlawful discrimination.”  Brake, 
supra note 109, at 516. 
 134  See Miller, supra note 131, at 142. 
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Court’s practice of extending the benefit more evident than in its equal 
protection jurisprudence involving gender classifications. 
1. Frontiero v. Richardson 
In Frontiero v. Richardson,135 the Court considered a constitutional 
challenge to a statutory scheme136 that provided increased fringe benefits to 
members of the uniformed services who had dependents.  The statutes 
entitled the servicemembers “to an increased ‘basic allowence [sic] for 
quarters’ and . . . [the] member’s dependents [to] comprehensive medical 
and dental care.”137  The statute provided that a serviceman could claim his 
wife as a dependent irrespective of whether she depended on him for support; 
however, a servicewoman could not claim her husband as a dependent unless 
he was “in fact dependent upon her for over one-half of his support.”138  
Sharron Frontiero, a female lieutenant of the United States Air Force, sought 
increased benefits for her and her husband.  Her application was ultimately 
denied as a result of her failure to show that her husband in fact depended on 
her for more than one-half of his support.139 
Frontiero challenged the gender distinction, alleging that the statutory 
scheme violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it 
unreasonably placed a proof-of-dependency burden on women that it did not 
place on men.140  The Supreme Court, expanding on its decision in Reed v. 
Reed,141 applied intermediate scrutiny in holding the statutes 
unconstitutional.142  Because the challenged statutes “command[ed] 
dissimilar treatment for men and women who [were] similarly situated,” the 
Court sought evidence to support the differential treatment.143  The 
government contended that the statutes’ gender distinction served 
administrative efficiency; however, the Court found this justification, 
without concrete evidence, insufficient to withstand heightened judicial 
scrutiny.144  To redress the constitutional infirmity, the Court eliminated the 
 
 135  411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 136  37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403 (1962); 10 U.S.C §§ 1072, 1076 (1958). 
 137  Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 679–80. 
 138  Id. at 678–79 (emphasis added). 
 139  Id. at 680 (emphasis added). 
 140  Id. at 680 & n.5, 690–91 (“[W]hile the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection 
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is ‘so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.’” 
(alteration in original)). 
 141  404 U.S. 71 (1971).  
 142  Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688 (“[C]lassifications based upon sex, like classifications 
based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be 
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.”). 
 143  Id. at 688. 
 144  Id. at 688–90 (“[A]lthough efficacious administration of governmental programs is 
not without some importance, the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and 
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proof-of-dependency requirement imposed on women, thereby extending the 
benefit accorded to men—namely, the lack of such a requirement—to 
women.145 
2. Califano v. Westcott 
The Supreme Court’s practice of extending the particular benefit was 
further institutionalized in Califano v. Westcott.146  The Court addressed a 
constitutional challenge to § 407 of the Social Security Act,147 which granted 
benefits to families whose dependent children were deprived of parental 
support because of the father’s unemployment, but did not grant such 
benefits to families who lacked support because of the mother’s 
unemployment.148  Two couples applied for public assistance because the 
wives—the former breadwinners in each respective family—and their 
husbands were unemployed.149  The families were denied benefits on the 
ground that the husbands’ prior work histories were insufficient to render 
them “unemployed” under the Act, notwithstanding the fact that the wives 
satisfied the unemployment criteria.150  The couples challenged the 
provision’s gender distinction as repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.151 
The district court declared § 407 unconstitutional, finding that the 
gender differentiation was not “substantially related to the achievement of 
any important governmental interests.”152  More specifically, the district 
court found that the differentiation failed intermediate scrutiny because it 
rested on an “archaic and overbroad generalization” that the loss of mothers’ 
earnings in two-parent families did not significantly affect families because 
 
efficiency . . . .  [A]ny statutory scheme [that] draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for 
the purpose of achieving administrative convenience . . . involves the very kind of arbitrary 
legislative choice forbidden by the Constitution.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 145  Id. at 690–91 n.25.  The Court explained that its conclusion invalidated only the 
portion of the statutory scheme that “require[s] a female member to prove the dependency of 
her spouse.”  Id. 
 146  443 U.S. 76 (1979). 
 147  Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1935). 
 148  Westcott, 443 U.S. at 78. 
 149  Id. at 80–81.  
 150  Id. at 80–81 n.1.  To be eligible for benefits under § 407 of the Act, a family had to 
meet both financial and categorical requirements.  Id.  The States determined the financial 
requirements, while the Federal Government determined the categorical requirements.  Id.  
The Act itself delineated the requirements for satisfying the “unemployment” definition under 
the Act that “w[ould] render a family eligible for . . . benefits.”  Id.  Most importantly, the 
regulations spoke “in terms of the unemployment of the ‘father.’”  Id. 
 151  Id. at 81.  The families also challenged § 407 as violating the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Id. 
 152  Id. at 81–82 (applying intermediate scrutiny standard for gender classifications). 
DE SOUSA (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2019  6:45 PM 
1144 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1123 
women were not traditional breadwinners.153  To remedy the constitutional 
infirmity, the lower court ordered that benefits paid to families that are 
deprived of parental support because of the father’s unemployment must also 
be paid to families deprived of such support because of the mother’s 
unemployment.154  Thus, the district court extended the benefit. 
The Supreme Court agreed that the gender classification did not survive 
constitutional scrutiny because it was “not substantially related to the 
attainment of any important and valid statutory goals.”155  Rather, the Court 
added, it rested on stereotypes that a “father has the primary responsibility 
to provide . . . while the mother is the center of home and family life” and 
legislation that finds its support in such presumptions without concrete 
evidence cannot survive heightened judicial scrutiny.156  The Court, 
therefore, affirmed the lower court’s decision to extend the benefit to 
families of unemployed mothers, concluding that such a remedy was not only 
consistent with its longstanding practice of extension, but was also supported 
by “equitable considerations.”157 
These cases demonstrate the Court’s longstanding practice of extending 
the benefit—or “leveling up”—to remedy equal protection violations, 
particularly when grappling with gender-based discrimination.  
Notwithstanding this practice, the Morales-Santana Court took the 
unprecedented step of remedying the relevant equal protection violation by 
“leveling down,” namely by nullifying the one-year exception for unmarried 
U.S.-citizen mothers—the benefit—and applying the longer, ten-year 
residency requirement to all non-marital children irrespective of the U.S.-
citizen parent’s gender.158  This unique choice of remedy suggests that the 
Court is not yielding to Congress’s plenary power over all immigration 
matters.  Instead, it intimates that the plenary power’s reach is limited, 
particularly when equal protection principles are involved. 
 
 153  Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 154  Westcott, 443 U.S. at 82 (“The court saw two remedial alternatives: a simple injunction 
against further operation of the . . . program, or extension of the program to all families with 
needy children where either parent is unemployed.  The court decided that extension, rather 
than nullification, was the proper remedial course . . . .”). 
 155  Id. at 89. 
 156  Id. at 90. 
 157  Id. at 89–90 (“In previous cases involving equal protection challenges to 
underinclusive federal benefits statutes, this Court has suggested that extension, rather than 
nullification, is the proper course.”  In weighing the proper choice here, the Court reasoned 
that “[a]pproximately 300,000 needy children currently receive . . . benefits [under § 407], 
and an injunction suspending the program’s operation would impose hardship on beneficiaries 
whom Congress plainly meant to protect.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 158  Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1701 (2017). 
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IV. SESSIONS V. MORALES-SANTANA159 
Luis Ramón Morales-Santana was convicted of several offenses under 
the New York Penal Law, which triggered removal proceedings by the 
United States Government.  To resist removal, Morales-Santana asserted 
U.S. citizenship as derived from his father.  When his application was 
unsuccessful, Morales-Santana alleged an equal protection violation 
resulting from a gender differentiation in applicable INA provisions.  This 
Part briefly addresses Morales-Santana’s background, followed by a 
discussion of the Second Circuit’s resolution of the asserted equal protection 
violation and the Supreme Court’s decision in Morales-Santana, focusing on 
its approach to the equal protection violation. 
A. Background 
Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic in 1962 to a 
U.S.-citizen father and a Dominican mother.160  His father, José Morales, left 
his childhood home in Puerto Rico in 1919, twenty days before his 
nineteenth birthday, to work in the Dominican Republic.161  Once there, he 
met a Dominican woman named Yrma Santana Montilla.162  In 1962, Yrma 
gave birth to their child, Morales-Santana, and the pair married in 1970.163  
Morales-Santana subsequently moved to Puerto Rico in 1975 and then to 
New York in 1976 as a lawful permanent resident.164 
In 2000, Morales-Santana faced removal proceedings after receiving 
various felony convictions.165  Morales-Santana applied for a stay of 
removal, claiming he derived U.S. citizenship from his father’s U.S. 
citizenship under § 1409.166  The Government, however, classified Morales-
Santana as an alien because at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth, his father 
did not satisfy the physical-presence requirement applicable to unwed 
fathers.167  Consequently, an immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s 
citizenship claim and “ordered [his] removal to the Dominican Republic.”168 
 
 159  See generally id. 
 160  Id. at 1687–88. 
 161  Id. at 1687.  Morales-Santana’s father acquired U.S. citizenship in 1917 pursuant to 
the Jones Act.  See Jones Act of Puerto Rico, Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). 
 162  See Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688. 
 163  Id.  “Morales–Santana was . . . ‘legitimat[ed]’ by his father upon his parents’ marriage 
in 1970 and admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1975.”  See 
Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (internal citations omitted). 
 164  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688. 
 165  Id.  
 166  See id.; see also Lynch, 804 F.3d at 524–25. 
 167  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688. 
 168  Id. 
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In 2010, Morales-Santana sought to reopen his removal proceedings on 
the basis of an equal protection violation.169  Morales-Santana challenged §§ 
1401 and 1409’s gender-based distinction in the treatment of derivative 
citizenship conferral rights, alleging that the then-applicable ten-year170 
residency requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, juxtaposed with the 
one-year physical presence requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen mothers, 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.171  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Morales-Santana relief.172 
B. The Second Circuit’s Remedy 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the BIA’s 
decision, holding the gender-based differential in §§ 1401 and 1409 
unconstitutional as violating the equal protection guarantee.173  The Second 
Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny in reviewing the INA provisions 
because the law “discriminate[d] on the basis of gender.”174  In rejecting the 
government’s request to apply rational basis review, the court distinguished 
Morales-Santana’s claim of pre-existing citizenship at birth with Fiallo’s175 
claim of special preference for admission of non-citizens.176  The Court 
reasoned that, while “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of 
Congress more complete than it is over the admission [or removal] of aliens,” 
a claim of pre-existing citizenship is not an “issue of alienage that would 
trigger special deference” to Congress.177  Accordingly, the court found that 
Fiallo’s deferential standard did not govern and thus, the gender-based 
scheme in §§ 1401 and 1409 must be “substantially related to an actual and 
 
 169  Id.  Morales-Santana made three additional arguments in support of derivative 
citizenship; however, those arguments are not addressed in this Comment because they are 
not relevant to the alleged equal protection violation or Congress’s plenary power over 
immigration matters.  See Lynch, 804 F.3d at 525. 
 170  Morales-Santana necessarily challenged the ten-year requirement present in the 1952 
Act applicable at the time of his birth and not the five-year requirement present in the current 
version of the Act; however, both versions reflect a gender differentiation.  Compare 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1401(a)(7) (1958), with 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018).  For purposes of clarity, this Comment 
will refer to the duration of residency requirement as the “five-year requirement.” 
 171  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1688–89 (“Because § 1409 treats sons and daughters 
alike,” Morales-Santana alleged the gender-discrimination claim on behalf of his father “who 
was unwed at the time of Morales-Santana’s birth and was not accorded the right an unwed 
U.S.-citizen mother would have to transmit U.S. citizenship to her child.”). 
 172  Id. at 1688.  
 173  Lynch, 804 F.3d at 528, 538. 
 174  Id. at 528. 
 175  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977). 
 176  Lynch, 804 F.3d at 528 (emphasis added). 
 177  Id. (internal citations omitted).  Congress exercises plenary power over immigration 
matters; however, the Second Circuit emphasized that such power traditionally extends to 
issues of admission and exclusion of non-citizens, but not to issues of pre-existing citizenship.  
Id.; see also supra Part II. 
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important governmental objective” in order to be upheld.178 
The government articulated two objectives that would be furthered by 
the provision’s gender-based physical-presence requirements: (1) ensuring a 
sufficient connection between the child and the United States to warrant 
citizenship, and (2) preventing newborn statelessness.179  The Second Circuit 
did not find either interest persuasive, concluding that the gender-based 
scheme was not substantially related to the purported interests and that §§ 
1401 and 1409 therefore violated equal protection.180  To cure the 
constitutional infirmity, the Second Circuit mandated equal treatment by 
severing the five-year181 requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen fathers and 
“requiring every unwed citizen parent to satisfy the less onerous one-year 
continuous presence requirement.”182  This remedy, in turn, confirmed 
Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship at birth as derived from his father, who 
readily satisfied the one-year residency requirement.183  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in 2016.184 
C. The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Victory Without a Remedy 
The Supreme Court, in a decision delivered by Justice Ginsburg, 
affirmed the Second Circuit’s judgment that the gender discrepancy in §§ 
1401 and 1409 violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.  
The Court, however, explicitly disagreed with the Second Circuit’s remedial 
course, finding the extension of the one-year physical presence requirement 
 
 178  Lynch, 804 F.3d at 529 (“[C]itizen claimants with an equal protection claim deserving 
of heightened scrutiny do not lose that favorable form of review simply because the case arises 
in the context of immigration.”). 
 179  Id. at 530–35. 
 180  Id. at 531–35.  The court found that both interests were important governmental 
interests; however, they were insufficient to withstand intermediate scrutiny.  Id.  As for the 
first interest, the court added that the government “offers no reason, and [the court] s[aw] no 
reason, that unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers in the United States prior to 
the child’s birth in order to assimilate values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to 
citizen children born abroad.”  Id. at 530.  As to the second interest, the court found that 
“avoidance of statelessness [was not] Congress’s actual purpose in establishing the physical 
presence requirements” and even if it were, the interest could not survive intermediate 
scrutiny because gender-neutral means were available to accomplish the objective.  Id. at 531. 
 181  Recall that Morales-Santana necessarily challenged the ten-year requirement as it 
existed in the 1952 Act at the time of his birth.  See supra notes 6 and 170. 
 182  Lynch, 804 F.3d at 535–36 (internal citations omitted).  To make this determination, 
the Second Circuit looked to Congress’s intent in enacting the statutory scheme.  Id. at 535–
37.  Notwithstanding the government’s argument to sever the one-year exception for mothers 
and extend the more onerous requirement to every unwed U.S.-citizen parent, the court found 
that “the historical background against which Congress enacted the relevant provisions” and 
“the binding precedent that cautions . . . to extend rather than contract benefits in the face of 
ambiguous congressional intent” supported the chosen remedy.  Id. at 536–37. 
 183  Id. at 538. 
 184  Lynch v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016). 
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inappropriate.185  Justices Thomas and Alito, in a joint concurring opinion, 
found that the majority decided too much.  The Justices reasoned that, 
because the Court did not have the power to provide relief—”namely, 
conferral of citizenship on a basis other than that prescribed by Congress”—
it did not need to address the constitutionality of the INA provisions.186 
The majority nevertheless engaged in a unique constitutional analysis.  
Justice Ginsburg began by positing that §§ 1401 and 1409 “date from an era 
when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife with overbroad generalizations 
about the way men and women are,” with “[l]aws [that] grant[ed] or den[ied] 
benefits on the basis of the sex of the qualifying parent.”187  The Court, 
therefore, applied intermediate scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of the 
gender-based classification inherent in the INA provisions.188  Justice 
Ginsburg rejected the government’s contention that the Court should instead 
apply a rational basis review in light of “Congress’[s] exceptionally broad 
power to admit or exclude aliens.”189  Similar to the Second Circuit, Justice 
Ginsburg found Fiallo190 distinguishable and its deferential standard 
inapplicable, as it involved the admission of aliens, which implicates 
Congress’s plenary power, whereas Morales-Santana involved a claim of 
pre-existing citizenship, which arguably does not trigger such broad 
power.191 
The Court found the “discrete duration-of-residence requirements for 
unwed mothers and fathers . . . stunningly anachronistic” as resting on the 
obsolete notion that the unwed mother is “the child’s natural and sole 
guardian” and that the father is “less qualified and entitled . . . to take 
responsibility for nonmarital children.”192  Because “no important 
 
 185  Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1700–01 (2017). 
 186  Id. at 1701–02 (internal citations omitted). 
 187  Id. at 1683 (internal quotations omitted). 
 188  Id. at 1683–84, 1690 (“[H]eightened scrutiny is in order” and thus, “[s]uccessful 
defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender . . . requires an ‘exceedingly 
persuasive justification.’”  Such justification must demonstrate that the classification 
“serve[s] an important governmental interest today.”). 
 189  Id. at 1693 (internal quotations omitted). 
 190  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).  The Court also distinguished Miller v. Albright, 
523 U.S. 420 (1998) and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), in which the Supreme Court 
applied a rational basis standard in reviewing a parental-acknowledgement provision of the 
INA, because Morales-Santana involved a physical-presence requirement instead.  Id. at 
1694; see also Brief Amicus Curiae of The American Civil Liberties Union, The New York 
Civil Liberties Union, The National Immigration Law Center, & The National Women’s Law 
Center, in Support of Respondents at 7–8, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 
(2017) (No. 15-1191) (“[S]ince Fiallo was decided, this Court has made unequivocally clear, 
in numerous cases, that heightened scrutiny should be applied whenever laws explicitly 
discriminate on the basis of gender.”). 
 191  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1693–94.  
 192  Id. at 1691–93 (internal quotations omitted). 
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governmental interest is served by laws grounded” in this notion, the Court 
concluded that the government’s purported interests193 did not provide an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” for the gender-specific residency and 
age criteria, and that the provisions therefore violated the Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause.194 
The Court’s remedy for the constitutional infirmity, however, differed 
drastically from the Second Circuit’s remedial course and the Court’s equal 
protection remedial history.  Rather than extending the one-year physical-
presence requirement to all unwed U.S.-citizen parents, the Court severed 
the one-year exception and preserved the current five-year physical presence 
requirement, making it prospectively applicable to unwed U.S. citizen 
fathers and mothers.195  While acknowledging its long-standing practice of 
“extension, rather than nullification” of a federal benefit to remedy an equal 
protection violation,196 the Court noted that the legislature’s intent governs 
the remedial course chosen.197  Even more, when the discriminatory scheme 
involves an exception that encompasses the favorable treatment—i.e., the 
benefit—the Court must further “consider the degree of potential disruption 
of the statutory scheme that would occur by extension as opposed to 
abrogation” of the exception.198 
In finding that Congress would nullify the one-year exception and 
preserve the general rule if Congress were aware of the constitutional 
infirmity, the Court focused primarily on two factors.199  First, Congress’s 
inclusion of a more arduous physical presence requirement as the general 
rule suggests that it deemed actual residence in the United States to be of 
great importance.200  Second, the extension of the one-year exception to 
unwed U.S.-citizen fathers would significantly disrupt the statutory scheme, 
creating an anomaly whereby marital children receive “[d]isadvantageous 
 
 193  See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. 
 194  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1695–96, 1698 (“One cannot see in this driven-by-
gender scheme the close means-end fit required to survive heightened scrutiny.”). 
 195  Id. at 1700–01, 1698 (“[T]his Court is not equipped to grant the relief Morales-Santana 
seeks, i.e., extending to [Morales-Santana’s] father (and, derivatively, to him) the benefit of 
the one-year physical presence term § 1409(c) reserves for unwed mothers.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 196  Id. at 1698–99; see also Oral Argument at 22:55, Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. 
Ct. 1678 (2017) (No. 15-1191), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2016/15-1191 (affirming the 
Supreme Court’s practice of leveling up rather than leveling down in response to an equal 
protection violation and finding “one compelling reason to do it [in this case],” namely that 
“in this case, unlike in some cases, there really isn’t a choice between leveling up and leveling 
down . . . because if you level down, [Morales-Santana] gets no relief.”). 
 197  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1699. 
 198  Id. at 1700 (“In making this assessment, a court should ‘measure the intensity of 
commitment to the’ . . . main rule . . . .”) (internal citations omitted). 
 199  Id. 
 200  Id.  
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treatment . . . in comparison to nonmarital children.”201  Accordingly, the 
Court abrogated § 1409(c)’s more beneficial requirement and extended the 
current “five-year requirement . . . prospectively, to children born to unwed 
U.S.-citizen mothers,” leaving Morales-Santana without a remedy.202  Still, 
the Court deferred to Congress to “settle on a uniform prescription that 
neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender.”203 
At least two things are certain after Morales-Santana.  First, the Court’s 
decision provided Morales-Santana a victory without a remedy.204  While the 
Court considered the equal protection challenge to §§ 1401 and 1409 
meritorious, the Court’s method of remedying the constitutional infirmity—
namely, nullifying the one-year exception for unwed mothers and extending 
the five-year residency requirement to both unwed mothers and unwed 
fathers—left Morales-Santana without relief.205  Because the Court did not 
modify the five-year residency requirement for unwed fathers and because 
Morales-Santana’s father did not originally satisfy such requirement,206 the 
Court’s remedial course left Morales-Santana unqualified for U.S. 
citizenship and, thus, still subject to deportation; the very circumstance he 
wished to avoid in raising this equal protection challenge.  Second, post-
Morales-Santana, children born abroad to unwed U.S.-citizen mothers will 
face a more onerous process when seeking to acquire derivative U.S. 
citizenship insofar as they are now also subject to the five-year physical 
presence requirement.  This difficulty will endure unless and until Congress 
intervenes to affirm its intent and settle on a different prescription.207 
 
 201  Id.  The Court added that this “is scarcely a purpose one can sensibly attribute to 
Congress.”  Id. 
 202  Id. at 1701. 
 203  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1701.  The Court’s chosen remedial course is to be 
upheld “in the interim” until Congress addresses the issue.  Id. 
 204  See Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Rejects Gender-Based Distinctions in 
Citizenship Laws, SCOTUSBLOG (June 12, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinio 
n-analysis-court-rejects-gender-based-distinctions-citizenship-laws/ (arguing that the Court’s 
decision “was a hollow victory for Luis Ramon Morales-Santana” and that the “ruling may 
not help Morales-Santana . . . ward off deportation”). 
 205  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1698 (“[T]his Court is not equipped to grant the relief 
Morales-Santana seeks, i.e., extending to his father (and, derivatively, to him) the benefit of 
the one-year physical-presence term § 1409(c) reserves for unwed mothers.); see also 
Thomas, supra note 16, at 8 (“What was shocking was the Court’s decision in Morales-
Santana to deny any meaningful remedy to the [P]laintiff who had proven such anachronistic 
discrimination.  The [P]laintiff effectively lost because the Court refused to grant the 
requested remedy of applying the one year rule for unwed women to unwed men.”). 
 206  Recall that Morales-Santana necessarily challenged the ten-year requirement as it 
existed in the 1952 Act at the time of his birth.  See supra notes 6 and 170. 
 207  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1701 (leaving open the possibility that “Congress may 
address the issue and settle on a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages 
any person on the basis of gender.”); see also Glen Staszewski, The Dumbing Down of 
Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209, 226 (2015) (“If Congress disagrees with a 
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V. TOWARDS EXTENDING, RATHER THAN LIMITING, THE BENEFIT 
In the months since Morales-Santana, commentators have roused 
different assessments of the Court’s decision.  Some commentators argue 
that the Court’s outright refusal to submit to Congress’s plenary power 
signals an erosion of the Court’s longstanding deference to the political 
branches in immigration matters.208  Other commentators focus on the 
Court’s decision to apply the harsher five-year physical-presence 
requirement equally to unwed fathers and mothers, contending that it does 
not comport with the Court’s established practice of remedying an equal 
protection violation by extending the particular benefit rather than nullifying 
it.209 
This Comment argues that the Court should have remedied the 
constitutional violation in Morales-Santana by extending, rather than 
abrogating, the statutory benefit, thereby treating all non-marital children 
equally in accordance with Congress’s seeming intent to provide preferential 
treatment to this group of children.210  Notably, if Congress thought it 
justifiable to treat the foreign-born children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers 
preferably by way of the one-year exception (in the same way that it provides 
preferential treatment to a variety of groups in other forms of legislation), it 
is not implausible that Congress would admit similar treatment for children 
of unwed U.S.-citizen fathers.211  Still, the Court’s refusal to extend the one-
year exception to the nonmarital children of U.S.-citizen fathers does not 
indicate a decreased deference to Congress in immigration matters.  Instead, 
the plenary power continues to influence the Court’s decisions, albeit in a 
limited way when equal protection principles are involved.212 
 
judicial decision or wants to change the law for other reasons, it is the legislature’s 
responsibility to amend the statute pursuant to the constitutionally mandated procedures.”). 
 208  See supra note 12. 
 209  See Bridget Crawford, Is Ginsburg’s Decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana Good 
for Women?, FEMINIST L. PROFESSORS (June 12, 2017), http://www.feministlaw 
professors.com/2017/06/is-ginsburgs-decision-in-sessions-v-morales-santana-good-for-
women/; Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Made Our Ugly, Messed-Up Immigration 
Law Even Uglier, THINK PROGRESS (June 12, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/scotus-
immigration-gender-bf65cebccf9d/; supra note 15; Thomas, supra note 16. 
 210  In other words, the Court should have affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit’s decision insofar as the Circuit Court found an equal protection violation, 
but remedied it by extending the one-year exception to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers.  See Lynch 
v. Morales-Santana, 136 S. Ct. 2545 (2016). 
 211  See id.  The Second Circuit concluded that leveling up was the right course.  Id.; see 
also Thomas, supra note 16, at 9 (“[A] court could just as easily have discerned a different 
intent for Congress, as the Second Circuit did in the same case below.  The appellate court 
severed the longer general rule for unwed fathers, leaving in place a gender-neutral one-year 
rule that then applied to all unwed parents.”). 
 212  See Robinson, supra note 14; see also Collins, supra note 10, at 175.  
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A. The INA—An Exception to the General Rule and an Argument for 
Leveling Up 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) sets forth provisions for 
admission, deportation, and nationality.213  While the INA’s existing 
provisions address a host of concerns, the provisions at issue in Morales-
Santana—and thus relevant to this Comment—are those that provide a 
framework for acquisition of U.S. citizenship at birth by a child born abroad 
to a U.S.-citizen parent.214  The INA contains a clear statement of 
congressional intent: “A person may only be naturalized as a citizen of the 
United States in the manner and under the conditions prescribed in this 
subchapter and not otherwise.”215  Specifically, §§ 1401 and 1409 of the INA 
provide the primary rules for determining who “shall be nationals and 
citizens of the United States at birth” by instituting residency and physical-
presence requirements contingent on the parents’ nationality and marital 
status, among other things.216 
In particular, § 1401 provides for the U.S. citizenship of a child born 
abroad to married parents “one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen 
of the United States who . . . was physically present in the United States” for 
at least ten years prior to the child’s birth.217  Furthermore, § 1409 adopts the 
physical-presence requirements of § 1401 and makes them applicable to 
unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, “thereby allowing an acknowledged unwed 
citizen parent to transmit U.S. citizenship to a foreign-born child under the 
same terms as a married citizen parent.”218  Section 1409(c), however, makes 
an exception to this residency requirement for unwed U.S.-citizen 
mothers.219  Under § 1409(c)’s exception, unwed mothers may transfer 
citizenship to their foreign-born children so long as they were continuously 
present in the United States for one year.220 
As noted by Justice Ginsburg in Morales-Santana, § 1409(c) is unique 
in that it is the exception to the general rule for acquisition of citizenship at 
 
 213  See The Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163–64 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018)) (providing that the purpose of the 
INA was “[t]o revise the laws relating to immigration, naturalization, and nationality”); see 
also Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., 
https://www.uscis.gov/laws/immigration-and-nationality-act (last visited Mar. 13, 2019) 
(explaining that the INA “collected many provisions and reorganized the structure of 
immigration law.  [It] has been amended many times over the years, but is still the basic body 
of immigration law.”). 
 214  8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1409 (2018). 
 215  8 U.S.C. § 1421(d) (emphasis added). 
 216  See § 1401(a)(7) (now codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (2018)); see also §1409(a). 
 217  Id.  The residency requirement has since been reduced to five years. 
 218  Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1687 (2017); see also 8 U.S.C. §1409. 
 219  8 U.S.C. §1409(c). 
 220  Id. 
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birth.221  In other words, the five-year residency requirement is applicable to 
married U.S.-citizen parents and unwed U.S.-citizen fathers; however, 
unwed U.S.-citizen mothers are excepted from this general rule and are 
instead subject to a one-year residency requirement.  Furthermore, the 
general framework for acquisition of U.S.-citizenship at birth by a child born 
abroad is likewise unique insofar as there are three groups involved rather 
than two—namely, children of (1) married U.S.-citizen parents; (2) unwed 
U.S.-citizen fathers; and (3) unwed U.S.-citizen mothers.  These factors, 
according to the Morales-Santana Court, made leveling up to remedy the 
equal protection violation problematic.222 
Seemingly, the Court’s difficulty in choosing nullification—rather than 
extension—as the appropriate remedy arose in reaction to two issues.  First, 
when the Court has previously considered an equal protection challenge to a 
discriminatory exception, the exception generally “den[ied] benefits to 
discrete groups” that were available to others under the general rule.223  Thus, 
when the Court struck down such an exception as unconstitutional, the result 
was an extension of benefits that were previously denied.  In contrast, the 
Morales-Santana Court dealt with a discriminatory exception that 
extended—rather than denied—a benefit to a discrete group; namely, U.S.-
citizen mothers enjoyed a one-year exception to the more arduous five-year 
requirement.224  Faced with this perplexity, the Court, “serv[ing] as a short-
term surrogate for the legislature,”225 considered whether Congress “would 
have struck [the] exception and applied the general rule equally to all, or 
instead, would have broadened the exception to cure the equal protection 
violation.”226  Quoting Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Welsh v. 
United States, the Morales-Santana Court added that in making this 
assessment, it must “measure the intensity of commitment to the residual 
policy and consider the degree of potential disruption of the statutory scheme 
that would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation.”227  The Court then 
concluded that the longer physical-presence requirement—the residual 
policy—”evidences Congress’ recognition of ‘the importance of residence 
in this country as the talisman of dedicated attachment,’” and that the 
 
 221  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1687.  
 222  Id. at 1699–1700. 
 223  Id. at 1699 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 202–04, 213–17 (1976); 
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 630–631, 637–38, (1974); Dep’t of Agriculture v. 
Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 529–30, 538 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678–79 
(1973).  
 224  Id. 
 225  See Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 317. 
 226  Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. at 1700. 
 227  Id. (quoting Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
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disruption of such a statutory scheme by extending the one-year exception 
could be “large.”228 
Second, tied to a potential disruption of the statutory scheme was the 
Court’s concern that if it remedied the constitutional violation by leveling up 
and extending § 1409(c)’s one-year exception to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, 
the longer residency requirement would remain applicable to married U.S.-
citizen parents.229  Because the statutory scheme at issue in Morales-Santana 
involves three groups, the Court did not face the simpler task of treating two 
classes equally.  Instead, by providing equally favorable treatment to U.S.-
citizen fathers and mothers, married parents—the third group—would be 
subject to the more stringent residency requirement and thereby treated less 
favorably.  This result, according to the Court, would be anomalous.230  The 
“[d]isadvantageous treatment of marital children in comparison to 
nonmarital children is scarcely a purpose one can sensibly attribute to 
Congress.”231  Even more, this remedy could give rise to a separate 
constitutional violation—the unequal treatment of married parents in 
juxtaposition to that of unmarried parents. 
Nevertheless, the potentially jarring result from extending the one-year 
exception to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers should not have prevented the 
Morales-Santana Court from leveling up to remedy the constitutional 
violation.  The Court could have adopted a relatively straightforward 
solution: extend the one-year exception to all parents, married or unmarried, 
unless and until the statute were changed by Congress.  Going forward, 
Congress would still be free to choose a different requirement applicable to 
all genders and all marital statuses.232  The Supreme Court’s choice of 
judicial alteration to the statute in the interim creates more problems than it 
solves. 
B. Preferential Treatment in Immigration Laws 
A law’s preferential treatment of one group in comparison to another is 
not entirely anomalous, particularly in the context of immigration.  United 
States’ immigration laws have historically given preferential treatment to 
different groups of people.  The laws treat certain groups more favorably for 
a variety of reasons, ranging from protectionist purposes to longstanding 
 
 228  Id. (“Put to the choice, Congress, we believe, would have abrogated § 1409(c)’s 
exception, preferring preservation of the general rule.” (quoting Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 
815, 834 (1971))). 
 229  Id. 
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. 
 232  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, examining the same record 
that was before the Supreme Court, concluded that leveling up was the right course, so it is 
not as though a case cannot be made for that approach. 
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political agreements.  A significant example of such differential treatment is 
that of Cuban immigrants, who received special status under U.S. 
immigration laws as a result of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (“Act”).233  
Originally instituted to provide a safe harbor to those fleeing persecution 
under Fidel Castro’s regime, the Act made it significantly easier for a Cuban 
to enter the country lawfully in comparison to immigrants from other 
countries.234  A separate example of such preferential treatment is evidenced 
in the differential treatment of spouses, children, and parents under the 
Violence Against Women’s Act (“VAWA”) provisions in the INA who face 
removal proceedings and who are victims of domestic abuse.235  These 
provisions afford benefits to abused foreign nationals, such as permitting 
them to self-petition for lawful permanent resident status, that are not 
otherwise available to foreign nationals who do not face such abuse.236  
Accordingly, Congress has provided for preferential treatment of different 
groups and, thus, providing for such in Morales-Santana so as to create a 
situation in which marital children have more stringent requirements would 
not produce an entirely anomalous result. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Morales-Santana, some 
commentators critiqued the Court’s constitutional analysis and remedy as 
signaling a continued erosion of Congress’s plenary power over immigration 
matters, while others critiqued the Court’s contravention of its long-standing 
practice of extending, rather than nullifying, a benefit to remedy an equal 
protection violation.  This Comment contends that the Court’s remedy in 
Morales-Santana was improper, and that the Court should have extended, 
rather than limited, the benefit to remedy the constitutional infirmity.  
Further, while recent Supreme Court decisions have seemed to signal a 
“chipping away” at Congress’s plenary power over immigration policies, it 
is more probable that Congress’s plenary power is instead yielding to certain 
constitutional principles. 
 
 
 233  See Henry Cuellar, Stop Preferential Treatment for Cuban Immigrants, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/stop-preferential-
treatment-for-cuban-immigrants/article/2586889. 
 234  Id. 
 235  Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Provides Protections for Immigrant Women and 
Victims of Crime: Fact Sheet, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (May 7, 2012), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/violence-against-women-act-vawa-
provides-protections-immigrant-women-and-victims-crime. 
 236  Id. 
